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The evolution of entrepreneurial competencies: A longitudinal 
study of university spin-off venture emergence  
 
Abstract  
This paper aims to better understand the development of entrepreneurial competencies to 
create new ventures within the non-commercial academic environment. We build upon the 
evolutionary perspective considering where resources come from to help define these 
competencies and explain their paths of development. The study follows the creation and 
early growth of four university spin-offs within the UK and Norway. We identified three 
competencies of opportunity refinement, leveraging, and championing that appeared crucial 
for the ventures to gain credibility. Although selected competencies were inherent within the 
academic founders, the specific competencies for venture creation had to be developed or 
acquired. This was achieved iteratively through entrepreneurial experience and accessing 
competencies from disparate actors such as industry partners and equity investors. 
Propositions are offered to guide future empirical research based upon our framework.  
Keywords: Academic entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial competencies, opportunity, resource 
acquisition, university spin-off ventures 
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The evolution of entrepreneurial competencies: A longitudinal 
study of university spin-off venture emergence  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding how new ventures emerge is a major research challenge, and a better 
explanation of how entrepreneurial ventures are created and developed is warranted (Alvarez 
and Barney, 2007). The entrepreneurial process is inherently complex due to uncertainty 
regarding how best to develop a business concept (Bhave, 1994), acquire necessary resources 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005), and make effective decisions (Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, the nascent 
venture needs a broad set of different competencies to be able to proceed from an idea to a 
value creating firm.  
 
For most nascent ventures these competencies are not readily available, but have to be 
developed or acquired during the early phases of their development. These initial phases 
concerning the processes of venture development, or organizational emergence (Lichtenstein 
et al., 2006), have been largely neglected (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Understanding these 
processes is important since findings regarding the development of competencies and 
capabilities based on established firms may not be transferable to new firms (Zahra et al., 
2006). We investigate the specific competencies required to overcome the initial hurdles of 
the venture creation process in order to gain credibility with potential investors and partners 
and how these competencies are accessed.   
 
In the literature, terms such as competencies, capabilities, resources, assets, and skills are 
often used interchangeably (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). In this paper we focus on 
competencies and follow the definition of Danneels (2002, p. 1102) that a competency is an 
‘ability to accomplish something by using a set of material and immaterial resources’. A 
competency focus therefore necessitates consideration of the human aspects of the 
entrepreneurial process. Adopting an evolutionary perspective, we suggest that spin-offs 
develop competencies over time along a development or search path that is partly influenced 
by their starting environment but which also requires a departure from existing trajectories 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2004). 
 
To address these issues, therefore, we consider a specific context of entrepreneurial activity 
(Kuratko et al., 2005). We focus our investigation on the creation of spin-off firms by 
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university researchers based on academic research. These firms provide a novel context in 
which to begin to fill the research gap regarding organizational emergence in different 
institutional settings (Sapienza et al., 2004; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Due to the early stage 
and embryonic nature of university technologies (Agrawal, 2006), the high knowledge 
content, and the many actors involved, these spin-off firms typically face substantial hurdles 
that make them well suited to reveal how competency deficiencies are overcome. Moreover, 
the context is distinct as university spin-offs usually involve the development of a business 
opportunity based on novel and potentially disruptive technology or tacit knowledge emerging 
from academic research (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Markman et al., 2008). Godfrey and 
Gregerson (1999) propose that a focus upon the emergence of such technologies should 
provide new insights into the process of competence evolution. The university context 
arguably provides an ideal setting to observe the birth of potential high technology firms. By 
observing their genesis and early development, insights into how such firms can gain an 
idiosyncratic resource base to provide credibility within typically fast moving markets can be 
gained (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998).  
 
Despite being likely environments for high-technology firm creation, paradoxically 
universities are generally ill-suited to develop new ventures due to potential conflicts of 
interest with their traditional roles of research and teaching (Ambos et al., 2008; Shane, 
2004). As a result, university spin-off ventures that attempt to develop by deepening existing 
path dependencies will likely encounter significant barriers to competence evolution. Ambos 
et al. (2008) propose that academic entrepreneurs need to be ambidextrous to deal with the 
tensions between academic and commercial outputs. Academic spin-off ventures therefore 
require the creation of new development paths that depart from existing practices in the 
academic context.  
 
Although many studies have examined the university spin-off formation process (Mustar et 
al., 2006), there is a gap in the literature relating to  which competencies are necessary, who 
provides them and how they are developed. This presents a methodological challenge as it 
typically takes many years from the initial emergence of the business concept until the 
economic potential is proven in terms of market acceptance. Therefore, understanding of 
which competencies are necessary to create a new venture is typically deduced 
retrospectively. We resolve this challenge by investigating the process longitudinally and by 
observing firms transcending the initial phases of venture development, arguably the most 
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influential in terms of the path upon which the venture evolves (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; 
Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). In this way we can observe the competencies required to make 
the transition from academic research to the development of a potential commercial 
opportunity and how they evolve.  
 
An important threshold for nascent ventures is to gain sufficient credibility to access and 
acquire key resources such as financing and human capital to form the entrepreneurial team.  
In line with Vohora et al., (2004, p. 164) we define overcoming the credibility threshold to 
involve the ‘ability to gain access to and acquire an initial stock of resources, which are 
required for the business to begin to function’. We use two proxies to identify when the 
nascent venture passes the credibility threshold. Following Vohora et al. (2004), a credible 
venture needs a competent entrepreneurial team, which for university spin offs usually 
requires adding new team members beyond the original inventor(s). In addition, we propose 
that an early stage investment from a private sector investor with no formal connection to the 
entrepreneurial team is an indicator that the nascent venture has reached the credibility 
threshold (Lockett and Wright, 2005). Thus, in this study we pose the following research 
question: Which entrepreneurial competencies are needed for nascent spin-off ventures within 
a university context to reach the credibility threshold; Who provides these competencies? 
and: How are these competencies developed? 
 
We make several contributions to understanding the initial development phase of new 
ventures. In particular, we address the research gap regarding new venture emergence in 
different institutional settings by extending analysis of the role of incubator organizations to 
the traditionally non-commercial university context. We propose that two factors are 
particularly distinctive for university spin offs; the heterogeneous features of entrepreneurial 
competencies and the diversity of who provides them. Hence, we contribute by showing that 
it is not sufficient to state that certain competencies are needed but that it is also necessary to 
identify who provides them and how they evolve. First, we argue an opportunity refinement 
competency is needed to discover opportunities based on scientific research and to further 
refine these opportunities into viable business concepts. For this competency, career academic 
entrepreneurs appear distinctive in needing to evolve the ability to attract new team members 
with industrial experience who can identify and interact with industrial partners. Second, a 
leveraging competency is needed to develop and integrate the internal and external resources 
necessary to nurture the new spin-off venture. For this competency, career academic 
 6
entrepreneurs need to evolve their credibility and entrepreneurial experience to enable 
interaction of the entrepreneurial team with external resource providers and here the parent 
university organization, the university TTO, and public support schemes can assist the 
entrepreneurial team. Third, a championing competency is needed to identify with the venture 
and to convince others to contribute to its development. For this competency,  there is a 
distinctive need to evolve the championing competency from the entrepreneurial team and the 
internal university context to also include champions within external resource providers. 
 
By analyzing the evolution of competencies in an academic entrepreneurship context, we 
contribute to the somewhat limited literature relating to where resources to build new ventures 
come from. Specifically, we show how the evolution of these competencies depends on the 
starting configuration and context of the nascent venture. We make a novel contribution by 
showing that rather than being homogeneous, the three competencies of opportunity 
refinement, leveraging, and championing follow different development paths and that 
contributions from different actors are needed to build each competency. This study provides 
a novel approach to unravel the specific path by which each competency is built over the 
initial phases of venture emergence. As such, we contribute to emerging literature that seeks 
to understand how and when firms create new development paths that depart from existing 
path dependencies.  
 
By focusing on competencies, rather than actors at several levels of analysis, we contribute to 
reducing the research gap regarding multi-level entrepreneurship research (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). This helps identify the contribution of different actors to building and 
supporting the development of spin-off firms. These insights can inform policy makers, 
university administrators, educators, and support agencies about how to target their efforts to 
increase the number and success of spin-off ventures. Finally, by selecting cases in different 
countries, universities, and industry sectors, we obtain variation in both the external 
environment and the institutional context and thereby enhance the external validity of the 
study.  
 
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework which builds on 
the evolutionary literature on resource development to analyze the competencies needed for 
venture creation and early development. The third section presents the methodological 
approach used for the longitudinal study of four university spin-off processes. In the fourth 
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section, the empirical findings are presented in conjunction with our analysis and propositions 
are derived. Finally, a discussion considering the implications for further research and 
practice is provided. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
To investigate this area we utilise an evolutionary perspective on the acquisition of 
competencies and build a theoretical framework through integrating prior empirical work on 
the emergence of high-technology ventures, the influence of the incubator environment, and 
academic entrepreneurship. Following Conner (1991) and Ahuja and Katila (2004) we 
address a key gap in the literature concerning where resources come from. The answer to this 
question is particularly relevant within high-technology ventures as the generation and 
exploitation of idiosyncratic resource bundles provides, at best, only a temporary competitive 
advantage within typically fast moving markets. Godfrey and Gregerson (1999, p41) argue 
that to sustain a competitive advantage in this turbulent environment requires ‘an 
entrepreneurial ability to identify, develop and complete new combinations of existing asset 
bundles or new unmet opportunities.’ This builds upon the work of Penrose (1959), who 
argues that entrepreneurial ability should be considered separately and distinctly from other 
resources.   
 
Prior work on entrepreneurial competencies has focused on the individual entrepreneur 
(Chandler and Hanks, 1994; Man et al., 2002). Yet, for high-technology firms, it is unlikely 
that one individual entrepreneur possesses all the competencies necessary to gain credibility 
for the new venture. Consequently, high-technology new ventures are often developed by 
teams (Roberts, 1991) and studies of university spin-off projects have shown them to be 
characterized by a dynamic interaction of different individuals with different competencies 
throughout the start-up process (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Vanaelst et al., 2006).  
 
Rather than focus upon competencies, prior studies have used the broader lens of resources. 
These can be defined as the multifarious input factors needed to create a new venture (Zott 
and Huy, 2007). It has been shown that tangible resources, such as access to financial and 
human capital, are crucial for the entrepreneurship process (Cooper et al., 1994). In a 
longitudinal study of the evolution of resources, Lichtenstein & Brush (2001) identified both 
tangible resources (technology, organizational infrastructure, and organizational planning) 
and intangible resources (employees, knowledge/expertise, reputation, culture/identity, 
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relationships/alliances, sales and service delivery, business base, and decision making) to be 
necessary. They concluded that intangible ‘soft’ resources are more useful than tangible 
resources in the early stage of venture development. Moreover, studies have shown how 
informal networking (Khavul et al., 1998), the building of legitimacy (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002), and the utilisation of symbolic management can be used to acquire resources (Zott and 
Huy, 2007). 
 
Yet new venture creation does not occur in a vacuum. It is path dependent. A long research 
tradition has demonstrated that the institutional incubator environment influences the nature 
of the development of new entrepreneurial ventures through providing (or inhibiting) access 
to resources (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Mustar et al., 2006; Phan et al., 2005). Potential 
incubator organizations include industrial corporations, science parks, and universities. 
Studies of corporate spin-offs show that their development (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) and 
growth (Sapienza et al., 2004) is influenced by the resources inherited from the parent 
incubator organization, and that the degree of overlap of knowledge between the parent and 
the spin-off is especially important. Similarly, science parks can provide general management 
experience to assist new venture development in the firms located therein (Westhead and 
Storey, 1995), but this varies between different types of science park. The extent to which an 
incubator is embedded in an entrepreneurial system also facilitates new venture development 
(Neck et al., 2004). 
 
Universities provide a distinct institutional incubator environment that likely influences the 
evolutionary path of competence development. While the identification and resolution of 
knowledge gaps are the central concern of universities, the types of knowledge gaps a 
university deals with are likely qualitatively different from those faced by emerging business 
ventures emanating through corporate entrepreneurship. Studies have shown that spin-off 
formation can be significantly constrained by organizational and cultural barriers (Lee, 1996). 
The academic entrepreneurship process may be inhibited by a lack of business experience and 
commercial skills among academics (Vohora et al., 2004). This is compounded by possible 
conflicts of interest with other university tasks such as research and teaching (Mustar et al., 
2006). Consequently, the creation of spin-offs typically lacks consistent support at school 
level despite support by central administration. It is often argued that the pursuit of private 
gain is incompatible with academic values relating to scholarly freedom and can undermine 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge and the education of students (Shane, 2004). 
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Universities can be an important resource provider for spin-off ventures (Smilor et al., 1990), 
but universities may also have resource deficiencies and competency deficiencies that inhibit 
the new venture incubation process (Clarysse et al., 2005). 
 
The literature on academic entrepreneurship has identified specific resources and capabilities 
associated with spin-off firm formation, such as intellectual human capital (Zucker et al., 
1998), technological resources (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004), university level characteristics 
(Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Jong, 2006) and routines (Lockett and Wright, 2005). These 
studies have provided classifications or lists of resources and capabilities that likely foster 
spin-off creation and development. However, entrepreneurial opportunities are heterogeneous 
and as such may require unique sets of resources to be exploited. As a result, researchers have 
encountered difficulty in specifying a set of resources leading to superior start-up 
performance. We argue that the venturing process is not dependent on a specific set of 
resources, but on the ability to use combinations of both tangible and intangible resources. 
Thus, a set of competencies may be needed to gain credibility for the fledgling venture. For 
instance, the problem of a lack of resources facing a new venture can be overcome if the 
competency to acquire the relevant resources is available.  
 
Building upon the need for further understanding of entrepreneurial activity in existing 
institutional settings, Hayton and Kelley (2006) propose that four entrepreneurial 
competencies, or roles, are necessary in the context of corporate entrepreneurship: innovating 
(opportunity recognition and further exploitation of the opportunities), brokering (accessing 
and combining new sources of knowledge and information), championing (identifying with 
the opportunity and taking responsibility to move it forward), sponsoring (help in gaining 
access to the resources needed). Although universities present an existing institutional setting 
that is distinct from commercial corporate settings (Ambos et al., 2008), we propose that 
analogous competency gaps are plausible. Corporate spin-offs are concerned with building 
legitimacy for new products, services or ways of working within a context that is typically 
resistant to such changes (Sapienza et al., 2004). Similarly, university spin-offs are concerned 
with building legitimacy for commercial endeavours that are not the central concern of the 
parent organisation (Vanaelst et al., 2006). This argument is supported by studies that have 
observed corporate spin-off venture performance being constrained by a lack of competence 
(Sapienza et al., 2004) or that have proposed a link between specific competencies within 
academic ventures and venture performance (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Yet universities are 
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distinct in that they traditionally operate in a non-commercial context. The development of 
university spin-offs thus represents an idiosyncratic situation where the use of pre-existing 
capabilities may be limited and new development paths may need to be created (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2004). As a result, we may expect to see critical differences in how resources are 
acquired between the corporate and university contexts. 
 
Considering Hayton and Kelly’s (2006) proposal for the need for an innovating competency, 
academics may be skilled at innovating within the research domain yet this may be of little 
use in identifying opportunities within the commercial context (Lockett et al., 2003). Here, 
prior industrial experience may provide an enabler to allow academics to position their 
research within the commercial arena (Almeida and Kogut, 1999). However, regardless of the 
potential commercial viability of academic research, universities may represent an 
environment where the ability to develop relationships with external actors, such as potential 
industry partners, may be problematic (Kenney and Goe, 2004). To address the perceived 
barrier between academe and industry, actors may perform a brokering role, analogous to that 
suggested by Hayton and Kelly (2006) in the corporate context. For instance, universities 
have introduced technology transfer offices (TTOs) designed to help build strong ties to 
industry partners for collaborative research and the development of joint ventures to exploit 
university research. Despite the proliferation of TTOs, some authors have questioned their 
efficiency due, in part, to a lack of entrepreneurial and industry experience (Clarysse et al., 
2005). 
 
As an alternative to TTOs acting as brokers, Franklin et al. (2001) have suggested that 
experienced surrogate entrepreneurs should be used in a more direct role as champions or 
sponsors of nascent academic ventures thereby providing the remaining competencies 
suggested by Hayton and Kelly (2006). The use of experienced entrepreneurs is proposed to 
provide access to potential investors and potential customers via strong ties built through prior 
venture ownership experience. More experienced academic colleagues may also contribute in 
a sponsoring role. Studies have shown that academic colleagues with entrepreneurial 
experience can assist their colleagues at different stages of venture creation (Mosey and 
Wright, 2007).  
 
Within academic entrepreneurship, development of entrepreneurial competencies within the 
firms and the acquisition of competencies external to the firm may, therefore, have a positive 
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effect on commercialization success (Zahra and Nielsen, 2002). However, the creation of 
these competencies and the temporal role of multiple actors and how their relationships 
evolve in the early stages of venture development is missing in our understanding of 
entrepreneurial competencies. Although the concept of competencies appears promising to 
better understand academic entrepreneurship, we propose an in-depth investigation of the 
start-up process is necessary in order to build a more inclusive theoretical framework (Man et 
al., 2002).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research design 
To examine the entrepreneurial competencies needed, a longitudinal multiple case study 
approach was chosen, guided by the conceptual framework outlined above (Godfrey and 
Gregerson, 1999; Suddaby, 2006). This approach gives a richer contextual insight and an in-
depth understanding of processes that have been neglected in prior studies (Rothaermel et al., 
2007). From the literature reviewed above, it seems clear that different competencies are used 
at different times in the spin-off process and the actors providing these competencies also 
change over time. Thus, a longitudinal approach is warranted to capture the changes over time 
and reduce problems of retrospective biases (Pettigrew, 1990). Moreover, the use of 
comparative case studies is appropriate to gain insight into such dynamic organizational 
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Case selection 
The creation of new ventures is dependent on the environment (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994) 
and the institutional setting (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005) where the process is enacted. 
Organizational structure may facilitate or inhibit entrepreneurial activity (Burgelman, 1983), 
and cultural factors play a role in new venture formation within the university context 
(Kenney and Goe, 2004). To enhance the external validity and identify competencies that 
transcend significant contextual variation, we adopted theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
and selected cases within different national, university, and industry/ market contexts (Yin, 
1989). First, we selected cases from the UK and Norway which represent distinct institutional 
contexts. In the UK, commercialization of research has been high on the agenda since the 
1990s and an infrastructure of TTOs is well established at most universities. British 
universities have been highly active in spin-off creation compared to other countries (Wright 
et al., 2007). In contrast, Norwegian universities have only recently become formally involved 
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in spin-off formation. While previously belonging to the individual academic, IP ownership of 
academic research was only more recently assigned to universities from 2003. This led to the 
establishment of TTOs at Norwegian universities, increased awareness within the institutions, 
and increased public spending to facilitate commercialization of research. Second, in each 
country we chose one university with a relatively well developed institutional infrastructure 
for technology transfer and spin-off venture formation and one university with a less 
comprehensive commercialization support tradition, as the existence of support infrastructure 
may impact upon the acquisition of competencies (Ambos et al., 2008). Descriptive 
characteristics of the universities we selected are provided in Table I. 
 
INSERT TABLE I HERE 
 
Third, to capture different environmental contexts related to market and industry environment 
we included cases from two contrasting research disciplines; biological sciences and 
engineering. These disciplines represent the two major industries where spin-offs occur 
(Shane, 2004), however there might be differences in the need for resources (Druilhe and 
Garnsey, 2004) and the nature of social capital (Mosey and Wright, 2007) between these 
disciplines. This might be due to differences in the type of business activity or ‘business 
model’ typically employed by these firms (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). Finally, we selected 
cases where the spin-off was developed on the basis of a technology emerging from university 
research and where the initial entrepreneurial team included at least one academic researcher. 
Because we searched for projects in the early stage of development, with an incomplete 
entrepreneurial team and no external investors, prospective cases had to be identified through 
visits and discussions with contacts at each university. At the time of our study, we identified 
only a small number of cases that suited our criteria. After an initial contact with each case, 
where we presented our research objectives, we selected the cases where we managed to 
negotiate good access to collect information about their development process. Table II 
provides descriptive characteristics of the resulting four spin-off cases in the study. 
 
INSERT TABLE II HERE 
 
Data collection 
Data triangulation was incorporated by including several sources of data to map the situation 
and capture critical events prior to and during the development of the four spin-off projects. 
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Secondary data from the universities was collected through documentary sources such as 
strategy plans, annual reports, and web pages. Primary data from each university was 
collected through visits, conversations, and interviews. Primary data from the spin-off 
projects was collected by face-to-face interviews with the company founders conducted at 
regular intervals throughout a 12-18 month period from spring 2004. For each round of 
interviews we typically returned to the company founders to get an updated account of the 
development of the start-up process. In addition we identified and interviewed other 
individuals involved in the process to provide alternative perspectives. Interviewees included 
all company founders and members of the entrepreneurial teams, selected board members, 
university managers, people involved in commercialization support, and other relevant 
individuals. We made four rounds of interviews in cases Alpha and Gamma, and three rounds 
in cases Beta and Delta. The decision of who to interview in each round were informed by 
ongoing analysis and aimed to gain additional perspectives on existing data as well as an 
update on recent events in each case. Table III shows the respondent role and the number of 
interviews with each person.  
 
INSERT TABLE III HERE 
 
The data collection ended when each firm had reached the credibility threshold and additional 
interviews mainly confirmed, rather than supplemented, our existing data regarding the 
venturing process. A total of 54 interviews were conducted and each interview typically lasted 
between 45 and 90 minutes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed by the authors as part 
of the data analysis process. Following a narrative approach (Polkinghorne, 1988), the 
interviewee was asked to describe his or her involvement in and knowledge of the spin-off 
project from its inception to date, with a minimum of interruption by the interviewer. Most 
interviewees openly described their actions and the key events of the start-up process in a 
chronological order. The use of narrative interviewing (Czarniawska, 1998, p. 29) enabled us 
to get closer to the actual events and to avoid personal views and theoretical perspectives 
influencing the data collection. To gain more detailed information concerning the critical 
events and the actors involved as the start-up process progressed, we used open follow-up 
questions such as: “Why did you do that?” “Who was involved in this event?” “Did you 
consider alternative actions?” “When did this happen?” To avoid biases, the concepts of 
resources and competencies were not explicitly referred to by the interviewers.  
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Typically, archival data regarding the pre start-up and start-up activities of nascent ventures 
are scarce. Nevertheless, we were able to obtain information such as company presentations, 
financial reports, business plans, market analyses, and research documents from all cases. In 
addition, relevant written documentation was collected both from the interviewees and other 
sources such as magazines, newspapers, and the internet. By combining the different sources 
of information and by collecting information over a period of time through repeated 
interviews with central people, an in-depth description of the research and commercialization 
process was obtained. For confidentiality reasons the cases are anonymized.  
 
Data analysis 
From the data we identified critical characteristics and events that influenced how the spin-off 
venture emerged and developed. The interview transcripts and other material were read and 
reread as data were collected; emerging themes were refined as this process progressed and 
checked through the repeat interviews with the main players (Yin, 1989). The views of the 
different respondents from each case were also compared by representing the entire start-up 
process of each firm in tabular form and as a narrative text.  
 
To derive theoretical explanations for the processes observed, we identified observations that 
matched theoretical concepts (Orton, 1997). The data analysis focused on how different types 
of competencies were used to develop the nascent spin-off ventures and the sources of these 
competencies. To avoid conflating the multiple levels of analysis, the strategy of retroduction 
was used (Downward and Mearman, 2007; Leca and Naccache, 2006). Thus, as the analysis 
proceeded, the overarching logical frame shifted from exploring data, to building theoretical 
models, and empirically scrutinizing these models (Van de Ven and Poole, 2002). In order to 
avoid confirmatory biases, one of the authors did not participate in data collection.  
 
The data analysis is presented in two-ordered steps (Taylor and Bodgan, 1984). Initially, a 
first-order analysis of the development within each case revealed three main categories of 
competencies. In Table IV, we summarize our findings for each case structured by each 
competency. This was followed by a second-order analysis used to develop propositions 
through analytical generalization (Yin, 1989), guided by the extant theory previously 
discussed.  
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FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of new venture emergence in the 
university context by revealing the acquisition and development of the entrepreneurial 
competencies used for the new ventures to reach the credibility threshold. The findings 
presented below are an integration of our case studies and the scholarly literature.  
 
Achieving the credibility threshold: categories of entrepreneurial competencies 
Despite the unique technologies and markets and the different national, university, and 
market/ industry environments exhibited by the four cases, each eventually reached the 
credibility threshold (Vohora et al., 2004). The credibility threshold was defined as both the 
establishment of an entrepreneurial team and achieving external private sector finance in 
order to sustain the venture development (see Table II).  
 
Case Alpha was initiated by four university professors, but an experienced entrepreneur and a 
business lawyer were soon added to the start-up team. Alpha gained some initial funding from 
public sources, but within one year was able to leverage development grants from two 
industry partners that saw potential benefit in the business opportunity. After a period of 
prototype development and successful pilot trials, one of the industrial partners provided 
substantial equity finance.  
 
Beta was established by two university professors. Initially they were dependent on public 
funds, but soon needed private investment to sustain their development. The first round of 
equity finance was obtained through issuing a small private offering. This funding enabled an 
expansion of the entrepreneurial team by attracting professional business developers and 
board members. Subsequently, new rounds of private placements were issued to sustain the 
venture development.  
 
Gamma was initiated by a senior lecturer who recruited a post doctoral researcher with 
industry experience to develop the concept and gain seed funding from public sources. 
Through a local networking event, the inventor met an experienced entrepreneur who joined 
the team and recruited a finance and marketing director. Together they wrote a business plan 
for the nascent venture and pitched the idea to a venture capital firm who subsequently 
invested in the, now credible, team. 
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Delta arose from the research of two professors who gained a small public grant to develop 
the concept and recruit a post doctoral researcher. The researcher developed a business plan 
and began collaborating with an industry partner to develop a working prototype. 
Subsequently the industry partner became an equity investor and development partner for a 
new generation of products utilizing their technology. 
 
When we analyzed our case material, the concept of competencies emerged as crucial for 
gaining credibility for the nascent ventures. Without exception, the actors involved 
acknowledged that certain competencies were needed to articulate the latent value within the 
emerging venture to potential investors. For instance, an advisor involved in the Beta case 
explained: ‘It is difficult to know how to commercialize an idea; to sell ‘air’ is difficult, so you 
need competency. […] I think many commercialization projects fail because a lack of 
competency.’ (O1 - see Table 4)1. Further, the Alpha founders were very conscious of the 
competencies needed, as one said: ‘I believe we have been able to put together a team which 
has the critical competencies needed to run the further company development.’ (F1) 
 
As our research progressed, we identified three entrepreneurial competencies that were 
important for the nascent ventures to gain credibility. The first competency we identified 
related to the discovery or enactment of an opportunity and the ability to further refine and 
develop the opportunity into a clearly articulated and commercially viable business concept. 
Thus, we propose that an opportunity refinement competency is of crucial importance to 
develop the new venture credibility. The second competency we identified related to the 
development and acquisition of resources to build the new venture. Thus, we propose that the 
spin-offs are dependent on a leveraging competency to sustain their development. In contrast 
to the corporate entrepreneurship context analysed by Hayton and Kelley (2006), we were not 
able to make a distinction between the brokering and sponsoring competencies. The final 
competency we identified related to the personal commitment or the leadership role needed to 
sustain the venture start-up process. Thus, we propose that a championing competency is 
critical for a new venture to emerge. 
 
A summary of the empirical data from each case relating to each competency, including 
quotes from the interviews, is provided in Table IV.  
                                                 
1 The quotes from case Alpha and Beta are translated from Norwegian. We chose the direct translation of 
Norwegian “kompetanse” to “competency”, but an alternative translation could be “expertise”. 
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INSERT TABLE IV HERE 
 
Development of propositions 
In the next sub-sections we present the three competencies and how they contributed to help 
the four cases develop credible ventures. We derive propositions related to the evolution of 
each competency. 
 
Opportunity refinement competency. University spin-offs are usually based on ideas with high 
knowledge content and technologies that are radical in nature. The Alpha case was based on 
many years of engineering research, Beta was based on the discovery of a medical effect, 
Gamma was based on research into fluid flow measurement, and Delta was based on an 
energy saving technology. Although academic research was a necessary condition for the 
business opportunity to be created, it was not sufficient for the new venture process to start. 
Here they had to acquire and develop some form of market related competency to initially 
frame the business idea. Table IV illustrates the evolution of competence development, as the 
individuals started with limited skills but then added what was missing to enable the 
opportunity to be refined. This was observed most evidently at Delta where the academic 
founders were finding it difficult to understand the market value of their research. As career 
academics, they lacked the ability to interact with the market in order to position their work 
relative to commercially available technologies. They needed to access this ability and 
recruited a researcher specifically for this task, who had prior industry experience. The 
researcher explained how he used external actors known to him from his industrial career to 
gain valuable market knowledge: 
 
‘They (Founders 1 and 2) were just sitting in the lab wondering who to talk to about it, but 
scared to death of giving away their secret. I just rang people up and asked what they were 
looking for. It soon became clear that they were being squeezed for lower and lower running 
costs and that was where our kit really offered an edge. So we spoke to the TTO and started to 
think about how to explain how good it was without explaining how it worked.’ 
 
Thus, an evolution towards greater industry experience internally in the entrepreneurial team 
was important to be able to frame and revise the scientific knowledge into a viable business 
opportunity. This was also readily apparent at Alpha and Beta where prior industrial 
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experience amongst the academic founders helped them to understand the potential 
commercial viability of their research. This also helped them to interact with external actors to 
refine the opportunity further. In all cases the nascent ventures became increasingly dependent 
on using the competency of external market actors such as industry partners and prospective 
customers to sustain the development of the opportunity. A consistent picture was of an 
evolution from university researchers playing a very important role in the earliest stages of 
this process, with their interaction with other actors becoming more important in the later 
stages (Table IV). Thus, it was important to continue to engage the inventor(s) to achieve 
commercialization success (Agrawal, 2006). This iterative, ‘trial and error’ process where the 
original idea was refined through market actors responding to a series of revised concepts, 
was succinctly described by one of Gamma’s founders: 
 
‘It was so frustrating, each medic we spoke to gave us another hurdle to jump over that we 
had no idea was there. We went away, jumped over it and then came back with positive 
results only to find another hurdle, another type of test or whatever. It was such a 
rollercoaster.’ 
 
In all our cases the initial idea had to be refined several times before gaining external 
credibility. Thus, the opportunity refinement competency in university spin-offs, is about 
creativity and about adapting the venturing idea not just to the resources at hand (Baker and 
Nelson, 2005), but by also developing new competencies to bring the opportunity closer to 
market needs. The opportunity refinement competency can be seen as the ability to seek 
improvements in the opportunity combined with the ability to alter the opportunity according 
to new insights. For nascent university spin-offs, the opportunity refinement competency is 
dependent on a combination of high technological expertise combined with industry or market 
knowledge. Thus, interactions with industry were decisive for developing the initial business 
concept. This was a major challenge for the university spin-offs and appears to contrast with 
start-ups in general as the competency to enable these interactions had to be identified and 
developed. This leads to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1a: The higher the proportion of career academics in the entrepreneurial team 
of nascent university spin-off ventures, the more industry experience has to be acquired for 
the entrepreneurial team to begin to identify and interact with industrial partners and 
customers. 
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Proposition 1b: Nascent university spin-off ventures are more likely to reach the credibility 
threshold if they evolve the venture’s opportunity refinement competency through iteration 
of the entrepreneurial team, containing prior industry experience, with industry partners and 
customers. 
 
To sum up, the opportunity refinement competency likely consists of an ability to discover 
opportunities based on scientific research and to further refine these opportunities into a 
viable business concept. The lack of ability to build on existing academic research skills to 
develop market related competencies without recruiting new team members and contacts 
appears particular to career academic entrepreneurs. Thus, entrepreneurial teams with a high 
portion of career academics likely need additional industry experience to be able to develop 
an opportunity refinement competency. Key characteristics of the opportunity refinement 
competency are presented in Table V.  
 
INSERT TABLE V HERE 
 
Leveraging competency. The second competency we identified related to the ability to acquire 
and combine resources to sustain the new venture creation process. University spin-offs are 
often associated with particularly high uncertainty and risk, and typically need a long time and 
significant investments to reach profitability. As a result, university spin-offs are likely 
dependent on contributions from several actors to be able to develop and acquire the resources 
they need. This was seen within Alpha where the four professors had prior joint experience 
from their research and consulting activities yet needed to develop their competencies by 
recruiting two team members with complementary competencies to their own. The Beta 
founders needed substantial support from the university to set up the new venture. Gamma 
received initial support from the TTO and then recruited an experienced management team. 
Delta similarly required TTO support to help attract industry partners. 
 
The importance of gradually building credibility in order to acquire resources was explicitly 
referred to by many of our interviewees. In the initial phases of the venturing project, the 
focus was upon gaining credibility for the new venture within the university and to securing 
access to the requisite technology or IPR. For example, the Beta founders initially gained 
significant support within the university because their achievements through research and 
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industry collaboration were widely recognised. It is at this stage that the university or its TTO 
often provided access to resources. For instance, the university management stepped forward 
to support the Beta project both internally and externally, and both Gamma and Delta received 
initial support from the TTO. Moreover the TTO often facilitated access to public funding 
sources, a crucial resource to enable the idea to be developed whilst credibility was low.  
 
By contrast, later in the process, it became increasingly important to gain credibility among 
external investors by adding new members to the entrepreneurial team who had prior 
entrepreneurial experience. They were seen as necessary to help gain resources from 
investors, industry partners and customers. The benefits of this type of competency, often 
lacking within the university, were clearly explained by one of the founders of Delta: 
 
‘The firm we partnered with provided in-kind funding in the form of manufacturing systems 
for prototypes and test shelters. In addition they provide advice, collaboration and time. They 
provide market info as we have access to their customers who would make use of this 
technology so we have a route to market. They gave us an insight into how companies work 
with customers and how the system should be changed to meet customer needs’ 
 
Thus developing credibility may be a precursor for the ability to acquire resources (Zott and 
Huy, 2007). This was epitomised by case Alpha, where the founders were highly respected 
academics within industry, thereby making it easier to contact prospective customers and 
industry partners. After receiving initial funding from a large industry partner, Alpha gained a 
higher level of credibility, which made it easier to access other sources of resources, such as 
investors and customers.  
 
It appears that the university environment is rich in some resources such as technological 
expertise and access to skilled personnel which bestows a limited level of credibility outside 
the university. Yet what is distinctive about the university environment is that key aspects of 
the leveraging competency are often lacking, such as how to access resources from industry 
partners and how to communicate with external investors (Wright et al., 2008). More 
generally it seems that habitual entrepreneurs possess this competency, while novice 
entrepreneurs may need more external assistance (Mosey and Wright, 2007). As a result, the 
leveraging competency is likely to reside with several individuals both within and outside the 
university. Thus, we propose that: 
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Proposition 2a: The higher the proportion of career academics in the entrepreneurial team 
of nascent university spin-off ventures, the more likely the parent university organization, 
the university TTO, and public support schemes can assist the entrepreneurial team to begin 
to interact with external resource providers (such as industry partners and investors).  
 
Proposition 2b: The higher the proportion of career academics in the entrepreneurial team 
of nascent university spin-off ventures, the more additional entrepreneurial experience has 
to be acquired for the entrepreneurial team to be able to gain resources from external 
resource providers (such as industry partners and investors). 
 
Proposition 2c: Nascent university spin-off ventures are more likely to reach the credibility 
threshold if they can evolve the venture’s leveraging competency through interaction of the 
entrepreneurial team, containing prior entrepreneurial experience, with external resource 
providers (such as industry partners and investors). 
 
To sum up, the leveraging competency is the ability to develop and integrate the internal and 
external resources needed to develop the new spin-off venture (Table V). The leveraging 
competency can be defined as the ability to evolve the credibility and entrepreneurial 
experience needed by the nascent venture to gain access to resources. The nascent venture 
needs resources from several different sources, thus there is a need for credibility and 
experience in several arenas (university, industry partners, investor communities, etc). Due to 
the specialized research skills of academics, entrepreneurial teams with a high portion of 
career academics need additional support and entrepreneurial experience to be able to develop 
a leveraging competency. This means that many actors are involved in providing the 
leveraging competency.  
 
Championing competency. The third competency we identified related to the personal 
commitment or the leadership role needed to sustain the venture start-up process (Table IV). 
Our cases illustrated very clearly the important role of champions. A division of championing 
roles may be necessary in complex, high-technology start-ups (Day, 1994). Our cases show 
that an effective team seems to be important in order to be able to respond to and deal with 
rapid changes in the business concept. Grandi and Grimaldi (2005) found that articulation of 
roles and prior joint experience positively influence business idea articulation of university 
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spin-off ventures. Our cases show that the entrepreneurial motivation was often triggered in 
situations where slack resources allow key persons to focus their effort on the spin-off project. 
Thus, slack resources may be as important for spin-off activity as for innovation (Nohria and 
Gulati, 1996). 
 
As with the other competencies, championing was not static. In our cases, the championing 
role changed as the venture emerged from developing internal support and credibility within 
the university context to developing external support and credibility towards industry 
partners, customers, and potential investors. Thus, academic researchers might be important 
champions initially, especially with respect to championing the technology, while persons 
with another background may be needed to champion the commercial aspects in later stages. 
Thus, the championing competency needs to be altered as the new venture matures (Clarysse 
and Moray, 2004). Our cases thus extend the argument that champions are particularly 
important in the early stages of new venture formation, before the business concept is clear 
and the initial resources acquired (Markham, 1998). Yet, these academic champions appear 
necessary but not sufficient. In all our cases, new champions had to be recruited to tackle the 
very different challenges encountered later in the start-up process. This was explained by the 
new Chairman of Beta who had previously worked as a venture capitalist: 
 
‘When the Beta founders contacted [Venture fund] two years ago [...] they were only seeking 
advice. [...] My first impression of the Beta founders was that they were very serious and solid 
professionals, and very interested in doing this in a proper way. [...] That I became chairman 
of the board happened gradually. I was involved by commenting on business plans and 
applications, and worked maybe 50 hours the first half-year. Then the process of finding 
investors started, and with my experience from the [Venture fund] I became involved in the 
funding strategy.’ 
 
In a similar vein, Alpha and Delta emphasize the important role played by ‘godfathers’. That 
is, influential people in industry or other resource providers who make an additional effort to 
help the project. There were good examples of such influential individuals in all cases, such as 
the university managers in Beta and the experienced entrepreneur who became chairman of 
Gamma. The Gamma chairman became an effective champion within the external 
environment, albeit only after the inventor convinced him to join the venture, as explained by 
Gamma’s founder: 
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‘I met our chairman at a regional investors’ event. It was organized by the local development 
agency and the TTO encouraged me to go along and pitch our idea for VC investment. […] 
(B1) came over to me at the buffet afterwards and started chatting. […] He explained that he 
had founded three other university spin outs in the medical device field and gave me some 
great advice on how to sell my idea. I explained that we were short of cash but could he come 
and meet the team and see our kit. He agreed and got excited about the kit. He joined us pro 
bono and immediately signed up a superstar team. […] We got our finance director, our 
marketing director, all with contacts into the industry.’ 
 
Thus, the internal champions in the entrepreneurial team are crucial, but also external 
individuals or people higher in the organization are needed for a sustainable championing 
competency. As discussed by Howell and Higgins (1990), champions induce the commitment 
of others to the innovation by providing emotional meaning and energy to the idea. Thus, we 
propose that in the context of university spin-offs there is a distinctive need to evolve the 
championing competency from the internal university context to also include external 
champions: 
 
Proposition 3a: The higher the proportion of career academics in the entrepreneurial team 
of nascent university spin-off ventures, the more additional championing competency has to 
be acquired from individuals within the university. 
 
Proposition 3b: Nascent university spin-off ventures are more likely to reach the credibility 
threshold if they can evolve the venture’s championing competency by the entrepreneurial 
team, containing university champions, also mobilizing champions within external resource 
providers. 
 
To sum up, the championing competency may be defined as the ability to identify with the 
venture and to convince others to contribute to its development (Table V). Championing is not 
only connected to individual entrepreneurs, but to the entrepreneurial team and to outside 
champions residing in other organizations. Due to the distinct research skills of academics, 
entrepreneurial teams with a high portion of career academics likely need additional 
champions within the university to be able to gain outside champions. Many people can have 
championing roles and these roles can be held by different people throughout the venturing 
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process. It seems like a greater championing competency is needed the more complex the 
venture is. Compared to other studies of championing (Howell and Shea, 2001), our definition 
of championing is narrower, focusing only on the driving force and not the ability to spot 
opportunities and gain access to resources.  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
By focusing on how nascent ventures overcome competency deficiencies to achieve 
credibility, we offer novel theoretical insights into the initial phases of the entrepreneurship 
process in the resource-constrained, traditionally non-supportive environments typically 
encountered by high-technology firms in universities. Specifically, we have proposed that the 
three competencies of opportunity refinement, leveraging, and championing are needed to 
successfully launch a university spin-off venture. We go beyond previous studies by showing 
that it is not sufficient to state that certain competencies are needed but that it is also 
necessary to identify who provides them and how they evolve. In some instances the 
competencies are built within the venture over time, while in other cases the competencies are 
acquired from sources outside the venture. We have offered propositions regarding the 
intricacies of how these competencies evolve in different ways.  
 
Following Kuratko et al. (2005), we identify several aspects of entrepreneurial competency 
development and acquisition that appear to be particularly distinctive to the academic 
entrepreneurship context as they require departures from existing development paths (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2004). Accessing the industrial experience needed to develop the competency of 
opportunity refinement seems to be a distinctive challenge for academic entrepreneurs since 
this is less likely to be present in academic founding teams but may need to be created 
through iteration with industry partners and customers. Accessing resources from industrial 
partners and communicating to external investors is also a distinctive challenge for academic 
entrepreneurs seeking to gain credibility for their venture since the leveraging competency 
required may be lacking in the entrepreneurial team. However, academic entrepreneurs can 
obtain this from a variety of sources including actors both internal and external to the 
university. Gaining access to the championing competency to develop a venture is a further 
distinctive challenge of academic entrepreneurship. Given the general lack of industrial and 
entrepreneurial experience among academic entrepreneurs, gaining external champions 
residing within industrial partners or other resource providers may be particularly important in 
academic entrepreneurial ventures.  
 25
 
Our competency approach extends entrepreneurship research in several ways. Prior research 
on entrepreneurial competencies has mainly looked at the characteristics of individual 
entrepreneurs (Man et al., 2002). Approaches focusing on the individual entrepreneur have 
been critiqued for exaggerating the role of single individuals, while studies looking at 
organizational structures and external environment tend to overlook the role of individuals. 
By focusing on the competencies provided by several actors, this study addresses the lack of 
multi-level approaches in entrepreneurship research (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001) and 
contributes to a better understanding of how entrepreneurial processes result from interactions 
among a broad array of actors.  
 
Furthermore, the competency approach developed in this paper goes beyond previous 
research that has tended to focus on associations that exist at one point in time to explore the 
mechanisms that lead to changes over time (Van de Ven and Hargrave, 2004). Thus, we offer 
a more inclusive framework to understand the initial phases of the venturing process taking 
into account the individuals, the context, and how the process evolves temporally.  
 
This research also contributes to knowledge about the role of the institutional incubator 
environment of high-technology ventures. These firms face a duality of challenges due to the 
typically fast moving environment within which they compete and the long timescale before 
they gain a competitive advantage (Shane, 2001). We propose that a pragmatic response to 
that challenge is the evolution of competencies to allow for the repeated reconfiguration of 
resources necessary to balance the ever changing needs of investors, partners, and potential 
customers. In an incubator environment where the necessary competencies are lacking, such 
as within universities, the competencies may be created by the interaction of several actors. 
We show how the evolution of these competencies depends on the starting configuration and 
context of the nascent venture. Although actors from outside this context are needed for the 
venture to reach the credibility threshold, the initial focus of the venture is framed by the 
academic environment, rather than by commercial concerns.  
 
This study also keys into the theoretical gap of how the initial resources for a new venture are 
assembled (Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Greene et al., 1999). By investigating the initial phases of 
venture emergence, we shed light on where firm capabilities may originate. As asserted by 
Teece and Pisano (1994), organizations need to renew their competencies in order to respond 
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to shifts in the business environment. Yet as more recently argued by Ahuja and Katila 
(2004), such renewal may need to occur not only along existing trajectories but also by 
creating new ones. By examining university spin-offs we expand understanding of when and 
how new directions for creating competencies occur since they involve idiosyncratic 
situations where traditional non-commercial competencies are of limited relevance. In this 
context, the challenge is not just to develop further high-technology innovation competencies 
but to develop competencies to be able to frame innovations commercially. A key distinction 
that emerges is the need to identify the different (internal and external) actors who can make 
the bridge between the academic and commercial environments. Although the role of industry 
experience and networks among the academic entrepreneurs has been pointed out by many 
studies, our study has identified the important role played by industry partners, what 
competencies they provide, and how these competencies and resources are accessed by the 
academic entrepreneurs. 
 
Limitations and research implications 
Because entrepreneurship is a dynamic process, theorizing on particular phases of 
development is justified (Shane et al., 2003). It is unlikely that one model can describe the 
entire process from initial idea to established venture. Our model has theorized the process 
leading to the credibility threshold, while other factors may have influence upon the further 
survival and growth of the venture. Whether the competencies and the sources identified in 
this study are associated with higher survival rates and superior performance needs further 
investigation.  
 
Another question emerging from this study is what competencies are exclusive to the start-up 
process and what competencies are important for the further operation and development of the 
new firm. These questions are important for the decision about what competencies should be 
internal to the entrepreneurial team and the venture, and what competencies should be 
accessed from external actors. It might be an advantage if competencies that are needed only 
during a limited period of the venture development are provided by external actors, because 
these competencies then will be easier to dispose of when they become obsolete. Thus, it is 
important that the more enduring or core competencies are built within the new firm.  
 
This study has investigated research-based ventures emerging in a university context, but the 
competencies may be relevant in other settings as well. Particularly in complex contexts were 
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many individuals and actors are involved in developing nascent ventures with an uncertain 
outcome. Thus, the competency perspective could be relevant to study the start-up process of 
new technology-based firms in general, new product development processes involving several 
organizations or units, and processes of institutional entrepreneurship. The competency 
framework is promising to reveal specific differences of entrepreneurial processes in different 
contexts.  
 
The use of a qualitative approach has provided an in-depth understanding of the competencies 
used in the initial phases of new venture formation. By following the cases over time, we have 
been able to observe the dynamic aspects of these competencies. The use of theoretical 
sampling covering different contexts provides some confidence that the patterns identified are 
likely to reflect those of other start-up processes. Still, our study is limited to four cases and 
should be replicated in other national, university, and industry settings for further validation 
and refinement. Larger samples and longitudinal research designs following the development 
of competencies over time and the outcome of the process are warranted in order properly test 
the propositions.  
 
Managerial implications 
By defining a set of three competencies necessary for spin-off firm formation this study 
identifies some implications for practice. Many of the competencies needed in initial venture 
development can only be supported indirectly as both the competencies and the networks to 
access such competencies need to be built over time. For instance, the opportunity refinement 
competency seems to be dependent on industry experience and interaction, the leveraging 
competency is related to the credibility and entrepreneurial experience of the entrepreneurial 
team, and the championing competency is related to individual motivations.  
 
The different nature of the three competencies implies that universities and government 
cannot apply the same policies and schemes to support the development of each competency. 
Opportunity refinement often depends on interaction with customers or industry, while the 
championing competency may be related to cultural factors, prior experience, and incentives. 
Since opportunity refinement and championing competencies have a stronger connection to 
the individuals involved, the influence by policy makers can only be more indirect. In 
contrast, leveraging is dependent on a range of factors that can be supported more directly by 
many different actors. Universities and support actors are well-placed to assist in accessing 
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and acquiring resources, for instance by building legitimacy and networks that provide access 
to resources. Thus, the competency perspective is useful for research institutions in 
developing their incubation strategies (Clarysse et al., 2005).  
 
Moreover, the competency approach is highly appropriate to draw implications for training 
and providing support for entrepreneurs. This approach can be a tool for assessing the existing 
competencies of an individual or team, thus highlighting areas needing further training or 
additional support. Also, the entrepreneurs can deliberately build strong teams where the 
different team members complement each other’s competencies.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, adopting a competency approach allowed us to gain insight into a complex, 
dynamic, and multi level process that is poorly understood. By focussing upon a specific stage 
of venture creation and a particular context that is infrequently studied, we were able to 
develop more inclusive theory. It appears that universities represent a somewhat 
schizophrenic institutional environment where they have a strategic aim to support new 
venture creation but typically lack many of the competencies necessary to achieve that aim. 
We aimed to gain a better understanding of the evolution of competencies and have built 
theory that helps to reconcile disparate findings from prior studies of new venture emergence. 
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Table I. Characteristics of the case universities in Norway (NO) and the UK 
 
 University A (NO) University B (NO) University C (UK) University D (UK) 
Age About 100 years About 30 years About 100 years About 50 years 
Important fields 
of research 
Technology, 
engineering, natural 
sciences, social 
science, medicine 
Social science, natural 
sciences, medicine 
Technology, 
engineering, natural 
sciences, social 
science, medicine 
Technology, 
engineering, natural 
sciences, social 
science 
Annual research 
budget 2003 
About 200 million 
EUR 
About 90 million 
EUR 
About 180 million 
EUR 
About 60 million 
EUR 
Industry share of 
research budget  
9.8% 2.0% 29% 32% 
Spin-off 
experience 
Many examples of 
spin-offs 
Few examples of 
spin-offs 
Many examples of 
spin-offs 
Many examples of 
spin-offs 
Spin-off support 
system (year 
established) 
Science park (1980s), 
Entrepreneurship 
Center (1980s), 
Science park 
incubator 1990s), 
University on-campus 
incubator (2001), 
TTO (2003) 
Science park (1990s), 
Science park 
incubator (2000), 
TTO (2004) 
Science park (1980s) 
TTO (1985) 
Entrepreneurship 
Center (1990s) 
Science park 
incubator (1990s) 
University on-campus 
incubator (1990s)  
Science park (1990s) 
TTO (1996) 
Entrepreneurship 
Center (2000) Science 
park incubator (2001) 
University on-campus 
incubator (2002) 
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Table II. Central properties of the spin-off cases  
 Alpha (A) Beta (B) Gamma (C) Delta (D) 
Founder(s) Four professors Two professors One senior lecturer 
one post doc 
Two Professors 
Additional team 
members 
Experienced 
entrepreneur and 
lawyer 
Two experienced 
business developers 
and chairman of 
board 
Experienced 
chairman, finance 
and marketing 
directors 
Industry partners 
Founded 2003 2003 2002 2003 
Number of 
employees in 2006 
17 12  8 10  
Time from research 
idea to spin-off  
~14 years ~8 years ~15 years ~10 years 
University ownership No Yes, major Yes, minor Yes, minor 
First premises University incubator Science park 
incubator 
City incubator University incubator 
Main R&D partner Industry University  University Industry 
Main source of idea 
development 
One professor’s 
industrial experience 
Professors’ prior 
industry cooperation 
Post doc’s industrial 
experience 
Post doc’s 
networking  
Field of research Engineering Biomedical Biomedical Engineering 
Product Software Medicine Medical device Electro-mechanical 
Business model Software and 
services 
Development 
company 
Development 
company 
Development 
company 
Initial funding Public funding and 
development grants 
from industry 
~£4000k  
Public funding 
~£200k  
Proof of concept 
public fund  
£50k 
Proof of concept 
public fund  
£50k 
Second round of 
funding 
Industry partner 
provide equity 
investment 
~£1500k  
Private placement 
~£300k  
Government 
development grant 
and fellowship fund 
£130k 
Government 
development grant 
and fellowship fund 
£110k 
Further rounds of 
funding 
Equity investment by 
industry partner and 
employees 
~£500k  
Several rounds of 
private placements, 
(>20 owners) 
~£400 + £1600k  
Equity investment by 
Venture Capitalist 
~£500k 
Equity investment by 
industry partner 
~£350K 
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Table III. Persons interviewed (number of interviews in parenthesis) 
 Alpha (A) Beta (University B) Gamma (C) Delta (D) 
Founders (F) Professor F1 (4) 
Professor F2 (2) 
Professor F3 (2) 
Professor F4 (2) 
Professor F1 (3) 
Professor F2 (1) 
Senior lecturer F1 (4) 
Post doc F2 (4) 
Professor F1 (2) 
Professor F2 (2) 
Team 
members (T) 
Business developer 
T1 (3) 
Lawyer T2 (1) 
Bus. developer T1 (1) 
Bus. developer T2 (1) 
Administrative support T3 (1) 
Researcher T1 (1) Post doc T1 (2) 
Board 
members (B) 
Same as founders First chairman B1 (1) 
New chairman B2 (1) 
Chairman B1 (1) 
Finance Director B2 (1) 
Same as founders 
University 
management 
(U) 
Department 
manager U1 (1) 
University manager U1 (1) 
Department manager U2 (1) 
Department manager U3 (1) 
Dean U4 (1) 
Department manager 
U1 (1) 
Department 
manager U1 (1) 
Support 
actors (S) 
TTO CEO S1 (1) 
TTO Business 
developer S2 (1) 
CEO science park S1 (1) 
University administrator S2 (1) 
University administrator S3 (1) 
TTO S1 (1) TTO S1 (1) 
 
Others (O)  Informal advisor O1 (1)  Development 
partner O1 (1) 
Total # of 
interviews* 
16 16 13 9 
University 
visits 
6 4 7 6 
Secondary 
sources 
Company 
presentations 
Business plan 
Press articles 
Company presentations 
Business plan 
Press articles 
Company presentations 
Business plans 
Press articles 
Company 
presentations 
Business plans 
Press articles 
 
*The total number of interviews is less than the sum of persons interviewed because some interviews 
were done with more than one person and some persons have more than one position.  
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Table IV. Description of the evolution of competencies in case Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta 
 
Case Opportunity refinement Resource leveraging Championing  
Alpha One of the founders pursued a career in 
industry for ten years before returning as 
Professor at the university. The decision to try 
to start a new venture came as a result of 
informal discussions. ‘The initial idea was 
different […] but [Professor x] came up with 
the current concept based on his industry 
experience […] and then the ball started to 
roll.’ (F2) 
 
External competency was mobilized in order 
to develop the business idea further. ‘The 
business idea changed a lot during the first 
discussions among the founding team and it 
was further refined during an interactive 
process involving industry and customers. 
[…] ‘the final idea was a result of an iterative 
process with [Industry partner] and the ideas 
we initially started with.’ (F2) 
 
‘The first idea was not right. [Industry 
partner] did not see any value in it. We had 
several rounds to better understand them from 
the inside so that we could adapt our ideas. 
The first half year was an iteration with 
[Industry partner]. We had numerous meeting 
at all levels to understand how they think. This 
was a heavy period, but very decisive.’ (F2) 
 
The professors deliberately acquired resources to 
realize the venture. ‘None of us had started a 
business like this before, and we were aware that 
there was a lot we did not know about such a 
process. [Professor] knew [Business consultant] who 
had been involved in many start-ups, and he also 
joined the team. In addition we needed some legal 
competency, and [Lawyer] joined the team as 
chairman of the board.’ (F4) 
 
The university were a fruitful environment for 
accessing the resources needed. ‘Because we are 
lacking knowledge in some areas, we have to hire 
people with key competencies. [...] We are in a very 
good position here at [University campus], with 
good access to much professional expertise.’ (F1)  
 
The professors had broad networks in industry. ‘Both 
[Professor] and I had prior knowledge and contacts 
in [Industry partner] that were used. The alliance 
with [Industry partner] has created a ‘domino effect’ 
related to other customers.’ (F4) 
 
The access to resources was dependent on the 
credibility of the entrepreneurial team. ‘When we 
enter a meeting and say that we are four professors, 
one business lawyer and an experienced 
entrepreneur in the team, we are accepted 
immediately. This gives us credibility.’ (F2) 
 
When the spin-off idea came up, each professor 
had for different reasons reduced their relation 
to their main industrial partner. The professors 
decided to explore the possibility to start a new 
venture based on their research based 
competency combined with their industrial 
knowledge. ‘We had achieved much [in 
research], but this was something new. We were 
also trigged by the opportunity to do this 
together. We were in a way pushed forward by 
each other.’ (F4) 
 
The professors were in a position that made it 
possible to spend time on this activity. ‘All 
professors in Alpha are well above average in 
productivity, so teaching and research is taken 
care of. The effort in [Alpha] equals what 
alternatively would be spent on consulting and 
other projects.’ (F1) 
 
External persons located in other organizations 
such as industry partners and government 
support agencies also contributed to move the 
project forward. One of the founders labels these 
as ‘godfathers’ who took action to help in 
difficult periods. ‘Also in [Industry partner] 
there was an internal ‘godfather’ who believed 
in the project and championed it internally. […] 
Without the help of these ‘godfathers’ it would 
have been difficult to get further.’ (F4) 
 
Beta  A group of university researchers discovered a 
novel medical effect and further research was 
funded by a pharmaceutical company and 
public sources. The company made a general 
In the initial period the two professors received 
considerable support from the university in the form 
of financial and administrative resources, power in 
the negotiations with industry partner, and internal 
One of the founders explained how they worked 
as a team in taking a championing role: ‘An 
important point is that it is much easier to be 
two. Things go in waves, and sometimes it is 
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decision to pull out of such projects. To create 
a spin-off venture became a new challenge to 
the research team.  
 
To match the scientific findings with a viable 
business concept was challenging. Among 
others, the local science park became 
involved: ‘We worked on structuring and 
narrowing down the project, focusing on 
product development issues and technical 
solutions that could generate income to the 
project, both in the short and long term. […] 
It was necessary to downscale the project in 
accordance with how much funding that could 
be possible to obtain.’ (S1) 
 
When some initial funding was in place, Beta 
was able to engage a strengthened 
management team: ‘[Consultant firm] is hired 
to strengthen the management of Beta. We are 
two researchers who will run a process where 
we have little competency. We will go into 
pre-clinical and clinical, and then is [N.N.] 
the right person. We will do a business 
development job, which is something 
researchers cannot use the time to learn. Then 
[N.N.] is the right person with his experience 
from other cases. So now we feel that we as 
researchers are complemented with very good 
competency in the areas we do not cover.’ 
(F1) 
 
credibility in the university organization.  
 
When the IPR was arranged and Beta formally 
established, the next challenge was to obtain funding 
for further development. Although some public funds 
were available, there was also a need to get 
investments from private sources. According to an 
experienced professor not formally involved in Beta: 
‘The process of raising funds was done by an 
organization [...]. This was not a success because it 
was not done in a clever way in my opinion. They 
arranged a great public meeting where 2 people met 
The problem is that there is not enough competency 
to get funding. […] So I told the entrepreneurs to use 
professional people here, someone with experience 
and who know about secrecy and such.’ (O1)  
 
Several actors provided assistance in the funding 
process. Through several iterations, Beta got access 
to the competency that subsequently led to several 
successful rounds of private investments. According 
to the new Chairman of the Board: ‘[Science park 
innovation company] have followed this project over 
time, so when they saw some structure and 
competency coming into the company they were 
involved and pushed this process. So they have both 
contributed with funding and credibility to the 
company.’ (B2) 
 
difficult when fighting with others and try to 
make things happen. When you are two, one is 
usually up when the other is down, and there is 
always one to pull the other up when things are 
heavy. We have worked together for 10 years 
and know each other well. Our motivation now 
is that both I and [Co-founder] really want to 
see that this project becomes something. We 
know there is a great risk. We are used to the 
scientific risk.’ (F2) 
 
The entrepreneurs continued to play a key role 
as champions for the venture. This was greatly 
acknowledged by the new Chairman of the 
Board that became involved at a later stage: ‘I 
have also been very in favour of that the 
entrepreneurs have an active role in the 
company. As it is now with [N.N.] as CEO and 
[N.N.] as CTO they are an excellent team which 
have a potential to go far with this. But it is also 
important that they get some support and 
expertise around them. If they get some 
keywords they are going head on and doing fine, 
but they need some sparring partners who have 
done this before.’ (B2) 
 
 
Gamma  The realization of the commercial potential 
began when a senior lecturer within the school 
of electrical engineering was discussing his 
work with a researcher within the school of 
human development. Together they theorized 
that his cutting edge research into fluid flow 
measurement could be used to develop a 
The university provided key resources to help sustain 
the venture as the founders learnt how to better 
address the market need. The TTO support was 
central to this effort. ‘Once [Founder 1] explained 
what they had to me, I did my best to keep them 
going. We paid all the patent costs and persuaded 
the head of school to allow them to use the lab to test 
Different individuals were seen to champion the 
venture at different stages of development, yet 
they shared a common motivation, as explained 
by the chairman: ‘I’ve seen this happen so many 
times in universities. The academic just wants 
his research to be used, to help save lives or 
whatever, and can’t understand why everyone 
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ground breaking medical device. They worked 
together to develop a prototype device and 
generated promising test results. When 
approaching medical staff, the academics soon 
realized that their enthusiasm was not shared: 
‘It was so different from the current devices 
that they were using that they couldn’t 
understand how it worked or how they could 
use it, it was very frustrating for us. (F1) 
 
Once the post doc joined the team there was a 
step change in opportunity development. 
Much simpler prototypes were developed that 
were more easily understood by the medics 
and test data was generated that showed how 
their new device outperformed current best 
practice. However, this took time and the seed 
funding raised initially from public funds was 
rapidly being consumed by patent, 
consultancy, and regulatory fees as the Post-
Doc commented: ‘[...] The TTO were great at 
finding money for patent costs but they had no 
idea about the regulatory hurdles for medical 
devices, it’s a complete minefield. We were 
really getting nowhere until we got our 
chairman on board’ (F2) 
 
their prototypes, during idle periods, free of charge’ 
(S1) 
 
Initially the senior lecturer gave the venture 
credibility within the school through building a 
relationship with other researchers and the TTO. He 
then delegated responsibility to his ex post doc to 
reconfigure the technology to meet the need of the 
potential customers. The team did not have the 
competency to articulate the potential value of the 
venture within the investment community. Only by 
attracting an experienced entrepreneur to the team 
did VC investment materialize.  
‘We got our finance director, our marketing director, 
all with contacts into the industry. In a few months 
they wrote a new business plan and took me along to 
pitch it to a local VC. … We walked away, after a 
few legal meetings with half a million’ (F1) 
 
else doesn’t share that passion. It took a long 
time to convince him that we did want to save 
lives, but that we have to spend a lot more time 
showing how it is going to make money than 
how it is going to save lives to get anything 
done’ (B1) 
 
This pragmatic view is echoed by the TTO: ‘It’s 
great that we finally got the kit made and it’s 
now being used in hospitals. It’s even better that 
[Senior lecturer] is taking business school 
courses and now wants to take his other 
research forward. I think the process will be less 
painful the second time around’ (S1) 
 
Delta Delta arose from the research work of two 
professors within the school of civil 
engineering. They were both interested in 
environmental issues and their research 
uncovered a possible method to increase the 
energy efficiency of air conditioning units. 
They developed a bench top model but were 
uncertain how to take this forward to illustrate 
the potential benefits to customers. ‘We knew 
we were onto something but we were both 
career academics, we didn’t know how to 
engage with industry and sell them the idea. 
The post doc who joined the team was able to work 
full time on bringing in resources to develop the 
opportunity further. He was active in building 
relationships with the TTO to help patent the 
technology, which ultimately led to securing a 
development partner. ‘To attract potential partners 
the IP office suggested we make some commercial in 
confidence flyers. We disseminated these everywhere 
we could think of. We said nothing about how it 
works. We sent it to businesses that may be 
interested detailing the applications and outlining 
the benefits. Six firms of differing sizes came to visit 
The two research professors were consistent 
champions for their technology for the ten years 
of development effort. A step change was 
observed once the post doc joined the team. 
Following the proof of concept period, he 
subsequently gained a fellowship to learn how to 
commercialize university based research. As a 
consequence of the fellowship he was 
introduced to networks of TTOs, industrialists, 
and potential investors, with the latter two 
groups investing in the technology once it was 
shown to have commercial viability in 
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Once we got the young post doc on board he 
went out and looked at what was out there, 
started us thinking about what was better 
about our device. We soon realized that 
cheaper running costs was how to sell it to 
potential partners’ (F1)  
 
The Delta professors applied for a small grant 
to help develop the proof of concept. This 
provided a post doc researcher for six months 
who wasted no time in establishing the market 
value of the invention. 
 
The post doc worked full time with potential 
customers to establish the comparative 
advantage of this technology relative to 
current offerings and then modifying the 
technology to meet the expectations of the 
market. 
us and signed confidentiality agreements. We had a 
dialogue with a number and then one came on board 
as development partners. They have been absolutely 
fantastic.’ (F2) 
 
The post doc helped to develop the business plan for 
the nascent venture. This plan was honed and 
developed through entry in business plan 
competitions and through close working with their 
new industry partners. ‘Our partners entered the 
concept into two business competitions. We came 
second in one and gained a lot of publicity. […] It 
also gave independent validation of the technology.’ 
(T1) 
 
Once the test results generated by the partnership 
proved positive, the partner firm moved forwards 
quickly and released more funding for the co-
development of a new generation of products 
utilizing the new technology.  
conjunction with their industry partner. The 
original professors were motivated by ideology 
rather than commercial drivers. ‘It is a long hard 
road from academe to commercialisation. You 
need larger tranches of money to bridge the gap. 
We started in 1999. […] We stuck to it because 
of our belief in the technology and dogged 
determination to produce something that would 
save energy and combat global warming.’ (F2) 
 
The post doc’s role grew as the development 
progressed and he became research manager of 
product development within the joint venture. 
This rapid career progression was a surprise to 
the post doc: ‘I took the proof of concept work 
as I really didn’t want to stay in the lab, but 
didn’t know what else to do. Once the kit started 
working well I applied for the fellowship 
because I realized this is what I really wanted to 
do. I think that this is where my talent lies, not 
just working in the lab but trying to take 
research out of the lab and turn it into new 
products.’ (T1) 
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Table V. Characteristics of the competencies summarized 
  Opportunity refinement Leveraging Championing 
Case 
specific 
details 
Alpha  Idea identified from industry 
experience and refined in iterative 
process with industry. 
Deliberate team composition with strong 
industry alliances and legitimacy towards 
resource providers. 
Motivated inventors with capacity and 
ability to engage support from others. 
Beta Inventors learn about business. Support 
actors and new team members help 
framing the idea. 
Strong university support. Iteration to be 
able to gain external investment. 
Inventors with high motivation to 
succeed. Were able to attract team 
members with complementary expertise. 
Gamma  Effort needed to communicate the idea 
to industry. Iteration to meet industry 
requirements. 
Initial support from TTO. Experienced 
entrepreneur framed and legitimized the 
business model. 
Motivated inventor. New team members 
joined to develop idea and business 
model. 
Delta  Idea framed by active iteration with 
market.  
Initial support from TTO. New 
development partner provided business 
knowledge. 
Inventors believed in the technology. Post 
doc enjoyed being an entrepreneur. 
Cross-
case 
common-
alities 
Competency 
role 
Opportunity recognition and further 
exploitation of the opportunity. 
Accessing and combining new sources of 
resources (tangible and intangible). 
Identifying with the opportunity and take 
responsibility of moving it forward. 
Key tasks 
throughout 
process 
Initial technology and market 
development and subsequent adaptation 
and refinement of the business concept. 
Initial institutional positioning and 
gradually more focus on external 
contacts. 
Initial entrepreneurial drive and gradually 
more professional management. 
 
